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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 11-1093 
_____________ 
 
JAMES MCKEEVER, 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
TOWNSHIP OF WASHINGTON; MAYOR AND COUNCIL OF 
THE TOWNSHIP OF WASHINGTON; MATTHEW LYONS 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(No. 0312-1:1-09-cv-01175) 
District Judge: Hon. Robert B. Kugler 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
Tuesday, November 15, 2011 
 
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, RENDELL, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: March 28, 2012) 
 
OPINION 
 
McKEE, Chief Judge. 
 
 James McKeever appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment 
dismissing various claims that arose from his termination as his township’s Director of 
Public Works. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.   
 
I. 
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 Because we write primarily for the parties, we will only set forth those facts that 
are helpful to our discussion of the issues.  
McKeever filed this suit against the Township of Washington, its mayor, and the 
Township Council.  He alleges, inter alia, that Mayor Matthew Lyons discriminated 
against him on the basis of his political affiliation, and that Lyons declined to reappoint 
him in retaliation for his 2001 lawsuit against the Township.  McKeever claims both 
actions violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
1
 
The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and this appeal 
followed.
2
 
II.  
 We exercise plenary review over a district court’s grant of summary judgment.  
Galli v. New Jersey Meadowlands Comm’n, 490 F.3d 265, 270 (3d Cir. 2007).  Summary 
judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(a).  Viewing the evidence “in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and 
[making] all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor,” Galli, 490 F.3d at 270 (citing 
Hugh v. Butler Cnty. Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 267 (3d Cir. 2005)), the court may 
grant summary judgment if the non-moving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to 
                                              
1McKeever also asserted political discrimination and retaliation claims under Article One 
of the New Jersey Constitution; however, the state law claims were not pursued on 
appeal.   
2
 The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  We 
have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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establish the existence of an element essential to [its] case, and on which [it] will bear the 
burden of proof at trial,” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 
III.  
 To make out a prima facie case of political patronage discrimination, a plaintiff 
“must show that (1) [he] was employed at a public agency in a position that does not 
require political affiliation, (2) [he] was engaged in constitutionally protected conduct, 
and (3) this conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the government’s 
employment decision.”  Galli, 490 F.3d at 271.  The third prong requires proof that the 
employer knew of the plaintiff’s political affiliation and that the affiliation caused the 
adverse action.  Id. at 275 (citing Goodman v. Pa. Turnpike Comm’n, 293 F.3d 655, 664 
(3d Cir. 2002)).  Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the 
employer to prove “by a preponderance of the evidence that the same employment action 
would have been taken even in the absence of the protected activity.”  Id.at 271 (quoting 
Stephens v. Kerrigan, 122 F.3d 171, 176 (3d Cir. 1997)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  “[A]dverse employment actions taken against public employees merely to 
make positions available for political supporters could amount to political 
discrimination.”  Id. at 273 (quoting Bennis v. Gable, 823 F.2d 723, 731 (3d Cir. 1987)) 
(internal quotations marks omitted).   
The district court correctly concluded that McKeever had satisfied the first two 
prongs of the test but the record did not support the conclusion that his political affiliation 
  
4 
was a substantial or motivating factor in Mayor Lyons’s decision not to reappoint him.3  
McKeever argues that Lyons’s decision to appoint Nicholas Pileggiwas motivated by (1) 
Nick Petroni’s sponsorship of Pileggi’s candidacy and (2) McKeever’s affiliation with 
the Moriarty faction of the local Democratic Party.  However, even if we assume 
arguendo that Lyons knew of McKeever’s affiliation with the Moriarty faction, the 
record would not support a finding that this affiliation was a substantial or motivating 
factor in Lyons’s decision not to reappoint McKeever.  In fact, Lyons stated in a sworn 
affidavit that he selected Pileggi because of Pileggi’s business and financial experience, 
and there is nothing in the record to rebut that. 
The record indicates that Petroni, a major contributor to Lyons’s campaign, 
informed Pileggi of an opening for the position of Business Administrator of Washington 
Township and that Petroni, Pileggi, and Lyons met to discuss the possibility of Pileggi 
being hired for that position.These facts alone do not demonstrate that Petroni induced 
Lyons to hire Pileggi as Director of Public Works.  There is no dispute that the Director 
of Public Works position was not discussed at that meeting; only the position of Business 
Administrator was discussed.  Thus, even if a reasonable jury could arguably have 
inferred that Petroni attempted to influence Lyons’s decision to hire Pileggi as Business 
Administrator during the first meeting, no reasonable jury could infer that Petroni 
                                              
3
 McKeever contends that the district court applied the wrong standard in determining 
whether he had established the third element of his prima facie case.  This argument is 
based on a misinterpretation of the district court’s opinion.  The district court applied the 
correct standard in determining causation. 
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influenced Lyons’s decision to appoint Pileggi as Director of Public Works.4That 
conclusion is supported only by speculation. Thus, the district court did not err in holding 
that McKeever failed to establish the third element of his prima facie case. 
IV.  
 To make out a prima facie case of retaliation in violation of the First Amendment 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, McKeever must show: 
(1) that [he] engaged in a protected activity, (2) that defendants' 
retaliatory action was sufficient to deter a person of ordinary 
firmness from exercising his or her rights, and (3) that there was a 
causal connection between the protected activity and the retaliatory 
action. A defendant may defeat the claim of retaliation by showing 
that it would have taken the same action even if the plaintiff had not 
engaged in the protected activity. 
 
Lauren W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations and footnote 
omitted).  To establish the third element, “a plaintiff usually must prove either (1) an 
unusually suggestive temporal proximity between the protected activity and the allegedly 
retaliatory action, or (2) a pattern of antagonism coupled with timing to establish a causal 
link.”  Id.  Failing that, “the plaintiff must show that from the evidence gleaned from the 
record as a whole the trier of fact should infer causation.”  Id. (quoting Farrell v. Planters 
Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 281 (3d Cir. 2000)). 
McKeever relies on a statement in Lyons’s deposition to support his assertion that 
Lyons refused to reappoint him in retaliation for McKeever’s lawsuit against the 
Township.  However, as noted by the district court, McKeever misconstrued Lyons’s 
                                              
4
 Lyons and Pileggi met a second time to discuss the Director of Public Works position; however, 
there is no dispute that Petroni was not present at that meeting. 
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testimony.  Lyons stated that he opposed McKeever’sappointment in 2005 because he 
was uncertain whether McKeever’s settlement agreement with the Township precluded 
McKeever from attaining tenure status upon reappointment and not because McKeever 
instituted suit against the Township.  Lyons’s explanation is supported by the minutes of 
the Township’s 2005 reorganization meeting.  During that meeting, Township council 
members, including then-councilman Lyons, voted on McKeever’s appointment.  The 
minutes indicate that McKeever’s tenure status was the focus of the discussion that 
preceded the vote. Thus, the district court did not err in concluding that McKeever failed 
to establish a causal connection between his prior lawsuit and Lyons’s decision to not 
reappoint him.   
V. 
 For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the district court’s order granting 
summary judgment in favor of Appellees.   
 
 
